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TELECOMMUNICATIONS AS A WEAPON IN
THE WAR OF MODERN ORGANIZED CRIME
Christopher A. Nolint
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
From the advent of large scale drug trafficking operations, law enforce-
ment has struggled to keep pace with the methods and technologies utilized
by the criminal groups orchestrating them. Major Italian crime bosses suc-
cessfully operated such a drug trafficking enterprise in the mid-twentieth
century.' In 1947, eight months after being pardoned by New York Gover-
nor Thomas E. Dewey and exiled to Italy, Italian crime syndicate and Ma-
fia boss Charles "Lucky" Luciano traveled to Havana, Cuba. There, he
called a meeting of the American "godfathers," where they discussed their
role in the burgeoning global market of drug trafficking. Luciano and the
leaders of the Italian crime syndicate developed a heroin pipeline, which
featured the import of raw opium from Turkey into processing centers in
Lebanon, refinement in laboratories in Italy, and subsequent distribution in
America through Cuba and other nearby countries.' In the decades follow-
ing World War II, the Italian crime syndicate exerted a stranglehold on the
trafficking of heroin in the United States.4 In Sicily, Luciano orchestrated
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I ROBERT J. KELLY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 16-17
(2000). The 1957 Apalachin meeting in upstate New York was the first time a nationwide
mafia conspiracy was uncovered. Prior to that date, the Mafia Commission had met every
five years since 1931, with no impediment from law enforcement. Id
2 Id. at 201.
3 ALFRED W. McCoY, THE POUTICS OFHEROIN 39 (1991).
4 KELLY, supra note 1, at 101. In 1964, the Bureau of Narcotics determined that the
Italian crime syndicate regulated ninety-five percent of the domestic heroin trafficking ited
States in the post-war years. Id. This was a result of Luciano peacefully solidifying the New
York mobsters into five crime families, which coordinated joint trafficking ventures. The
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clandestine operations to smuggle a significant supply of heroin into the
United States in packages of fruits, vegetables or candy.5 The contraband
was often distributed through Mafia-owned businesses, such as pizza par-
lors, in large American cities.6
In the 1970s, the struggle for power between Italian crime families in the
United States ceded room to other competitors in the drug trafficking in-
dustry.7 Armed with the narcotic cocaine made from coca plants in Bolivia
and Peru, Colombian drug traffickers took advantage of the situation. They
created their own distribution and smuggling operations known as cartels,
which oversaw the complete development of raw materials into pure nar-
cotics ready for distribution. 8 By the mid-1980s, the Medellfn and Cali
cartels controlled more than half the world's cocaine supply, and infiltrated
every major American city.9 Though the face of the traditional drug traf-
ficking organization changed considerably in the United States, the way in
which the South American crime cartels controlled prices, hid and laun-
dered profits, and perpetuated corruption'l evokes the power of Italian drug
trafficking "dons."
This Comment will explore the role played by modem advancements in
telecommunications in dictating the operations of drug traffickers and the
impact of telecommunications legislation intended to combat these opera-
tions. It will begin with a discussion of the structural evolution of modem
drug trafficking, highlighting the organization of the Colombian pioneers
of the most notorious cocaine trafficking organizations, especially in com-
parison to their Italian predecessors. While the Italian drug operations pri-
same five Italian crime families still exist today. PATRICK J. RYAN, ORGANIZED CRIME 41-
42 (1995).
5 McCoY, supra note 3, at 39. Luciano's heroin refinement laboratories in Sicily often
operated under the guise of candy factories. Id.
6 KELLY, supra note 1, at 241-42.
7 See id. at 72-73.
s Id. Farmers in Bolivia and Peru transferred coca plants to vast laboratories in the
Colombian jungles, where they processed them into cocaine and sent the product out for
transport. Id. Deep in the remote jungles of southern Colombia, drug traffickers set up mas-
sive laboratories to process cocaine. One such drug lab was called "Tranquilandia" due to
its isolation, and it thrived undetected by law enforcement despite producing approximately
$15 billion of cocaine in the early 1980s. Frontline: Drug Wars (PBS television broadcast
Oct. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Frontline: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript], avail-
able at http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/etc/script.htm. The DEA
thought it had turned a comer on drug trafficking enforcement with the publicized bust of
Tranquilandia on March 10, 1984. The impact on the trafficking industry, however, was
minimal; the seizure did not affect availability or purity because several immense cocaine
laboratories remained in the Colombian jungles. Id.
9 KELLY, supra note 1, at 72.
10 Id. at 73. Specifically, Colombian cartel members engaged in corrupt politics, cov-
ertly supplying security or narcotics for elected officials and law enforcement, and more
publicly eliminating those officials who targeted drug trafficking organizations. See RYAN,
supra note 4, at 52-53.
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marily depended on the concerted efforts of individuals to smuggle manu-
factured heroin into the United States, modem drug trafficking organiza-
tions have huge infrastructures. In these organizations, hundreds of cartel
agents must have the ability to communicate with all other facets of the
cartel in order to carry out their specific roles. For years the drug traffick-
ing sector of the Italian crime syndicate went undetected by U.S. law en-
forcement officials, who refused even to recognize the syndicate." During
the United States' "War on Drugs," however, significant law enforcement
resources were directed at minimizing drug infiltration into American cit-
ies and the social damage caused by the Latin American cartels. As a re-
sult, these drug trafficking organizations were forced to adopt more eva-
sive smuggling techniques to circumvent prosecution. They developed
sophisticated methods of communication to avoid initial detection. Part III
of this Comment examines the evolution of communications practices util-
ized by major drug trafficking organizations in the modem age of tele-
communications advancements. This part first documents the transition
from analog to a digital cellular age over the recent decades. Then, it as-
sesses law enforcement's ability to adjust to this changing technological
landscape and its struggles to keep pace in the collection of evidence for
criminal investigations in the face of innovative and illicit use of telecom-
munications devices and channels.
In Part IV, this Comment examines the laws Congress has enacted to en-
able United States law enforcement to conduct electronic wire surveillance
of telecommunications between syndicate agents. Specifically, this Com-
ment explains that Title I1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 ("Omnibus Act")' 2 is particularly effective in balancing the
government's law enforcement interests with Fourth Amendment privacy
issues. Next, this Comment discusses the ongoing attempts to adapt sur-
veillance techniques under Title Ill to keep pace with drug trafficking or-
ganizations and their use of modern innovations in telecommunications.
This discussion focuses on the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"), 3 which demands the cooperation of
major telecommunications networks to permit more widespread access to
electronic surveillance channels. This Comment will argue that CALEA
must be modified to require full compliance by telecommunications carri-
ers if it is to be completely effective in combating drug trafficking in the
coming years.
11 KELLY, supra note 1, at 17. The 1957 Apalachin meeting forced J. Edgar Hoover to
take action against this national criminal conspiracy. Id.
12 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968).
13 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994).
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Finally, Part V of this Comment ponders the impact of extensive surveil-
lance on the American people in the midst of a "War on Terror," and sug-
gests that CALEA and the Omnibus Act serve as examples of how the leg-
islation regarding electronic surveillance effectively balances robust law
enforcement while protecting individual constitutional rights.
II. THE NEW MAFIA: THE CRIMINAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
SYNDICATE
A. Structural Evolution of the Modem Drug Trafficking Industry
Compared to Italian and Colombian drug trafficking organizations of the
past, modem drug trafficking organizations are more complex. Like the
Sicilian heroin refinement workers and smugglers employed by the Italian
drug trafficking syndicate in the 1950s and 1960s, the key forces behind
the development of prominent Colombian drug cartels in the 1970s were
Colombian nationals, often related to one another. 14 Modem drug traffick-
ing organizations demand an enormous infrastructure, with hundreds of
individual agents, called "cells." These cells facilitate different facets of
the operation, ranging from narcotic cultivation and distribution to the car-
tel's business management.15 In their home countries, these drug trafficking
enterprises also rely on the aid of corrupt politicians and law enforcement
officials, who often turn a blind eye because they receive payoffs or are
threatened with assassination.16
A look into the evolution of the Colombian drug cartels, with specific at-
tention paid to the Medellfn and Cali cartels, reveals a complex framework
underpinning this primary vehicle for organized crime in the Americas in
14 KELLY, supra note 1, at 73. "For bloodlines and kinship, the Colombian gangs match
those of Sicily." RYAN, supra note 4, at 52. The Ochoa brothers, Jorge, Juan David and
Fabio, were sons of respected Colombian ranchers who became three of the founders of the
Medellfn cartel, a notorious Colombian cocaine trafficking enterprise. See Frontline: Drug
Wars, The Business: Colombian Traffickers, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html
[hereinafter Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers].
15 KELLY, supra note 1, at 73. Cartels employ thousands of Colombians and interact
with thousands more in the United States, often indirectly. Those who deal directly with
cocaine include farmers who grow coca plants in Bolivia, Peru, and more recently, Colum-
bia, to distributors and street dealers in the United States. Those who manage the business
aspects of the cartel include accountants, and lawyers, and chemists who process the drugs.
Id.
16 See id. Similar to the Italian Mafia, the Colombian cartel members frequently became
involved in corrupt politics, whether providing protection or narcotics for officials, or vio-
lently eliminating opposing politicians. See RYAN, supra note 4, at 52. See infra note 18 for
an overview of the fickle relationship between Medellfn kingpin Pablo Escobar and the
Colombian political system.
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the past several decades, and the foundation of a thirty-year war on drugs. 7
The Medellfn cartel rose to power in Colombia in the 1980s, capitalizing
on the demand for cocaine in the United States and other parts of South
America. The Medellfn was tremendously profitable because of the returns
it received on investments in its narcotics manufacturing labs. Violent drug
lords Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers powerfully led narcotics
manufacturing and smuggling operations. 8 Additionally, the Medellfn car-
tel cultivated social acceptance and public support through its public works
and community social programs. 9
The Cali cartel ("Cali"), named after the city in Colombia in which it
was based, employed organizational methods more consistent with the
Italian crime syndicate. Unlike the efforts of their Medellfn counterparts,
Cali's smuggling operations were covert and designed to evade prosecu-
tion and opposition.20 Not unlike the Italian drug trafficking organizations,
17 See Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14.
18 See Frontline: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8. Escobar
and the Medellfn effectively operated under the nose of Colombian law enforcement be-
cause Escobar's soldiers threatened police, government officials, prosecutors, judges, jour-
nalists, and even innocent bystanders with violent execution. Id. at 25. In 1976, Escobar
was arrested when Columbian law enforcement agents found thirty-nine kilos of cocaine in
his truck. When Escobar's attempt to bribe the judge failed, he blackmailed the judge by
retaining his brother as counsel. MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO 24 (2001). After the judge
recused himself and while the retrial was tied up in the appeals process, Escobar had the
two agents responsible for the arrest killed. Id. The violence and corruption continued when
Rodrigo Lara was appointed Colombian justice minister in 1983. He mounted a campaign
of investigations into Escobar's past drug activities and succeeded in getting Escobar kicked
out of office, which lifted his parliamentary immunity. Id. at 40. Three months later, Lara
was murdered in Bogoti. Id. at 41. A final illustration of Escobar's brutality and control can
be seen in the fickle manner in which he dealt with the media. When faced with legal trou-
ble, Escobar used the media to his advantage by transmitting messages to stir up public
support. When he was derided by the media, however, he would have reporters and editors
executed. Id. at 241.
19 Escobar, for instance, established himself as a modern-day Robin Hood. Frontline:
Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8. Escobar spent millions on im-
provements to city slums, donating funds, building roads and roller-skating rinks, and light-
ing soccer fields. Additionally, he started a housing development for the poor and homeless.
The community took notice of Escobar's philanthropy. Besides being "the richest and most
powerful man in Antioquia; he was also its most popular citizen." BOWDEN, supra note 18,
at 28-29. "The whole nation wanted to join Pablo's party." Id. at 24.
20 Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14. Cali management realized that
drug trafficking operations were more profitable when executed covertly, undetected by
Colombian and United States law enforcement and prosecution. Accordingly, kingpins
received briefings from prominent international lawyers who were hired to study the tactics
of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") and United States law enforcement. The
Cali drug lords also hired and trained technological engineers to develop communications
equipment which would avoid detection and interception by law enforcement. Id. The
Medellfn cartel also benefited from advanced intelligence that rivaled that of the DEA, and
thus reduced the DEA's threat to the narcotics organization. Frontline: Drug Wars Televi-
sion Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Cali engaged and invested in legitimate business as a front for their drug
trafficking operations. 2 1Both the Cali and Medellfn cartels had agents and
connections in Colombian law enforcement and politics, 22 enabling them to
receive favors and further evade prosecution in their own endeavors.
In the late 1990s, Mexico-based criminal organizations joined the drug
trafficking community by collaborating with Colombian cartels as cocaine
transporters and wholesale-level distributors.24 Today, Mexican criminal
groups exert more influence over drug trafficking than any other narcotics
organization, and Colombian cartels continue to rely on Mexican drug or-
ganizations for the transportation and smuggling of narcotics into the
United States. 25 The narcotics are smuggled into the United States by
21 See Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14. See supra text accompanying
note 5 for a comparison of Cali's Italian counterpart in drug trafficking. The Medellfn car-
tels amassed hundreds of millions of dollars each year and used the profits to expand their
cultivation and trafficking operations or outside business investments. Frontline: Drug
Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8. What made this trade even more lucra-
tive for the Medellfn was the fact that the Colombian government encouraged the creation
of funds in business markets with extremely high interest rates. Thus, investors in "legiti-
mate" government funds were in effect "cash[ing] in on the drug bonanza" in Colombia.
BOWDEN, supra note 18, at 25.
22 See Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14. Medellfn kingpin Pablo
Escobar immediately infiltrated Colombian politics with his election to the city council in
1978 and then to the position of National Congressman in 1982. This title conferred auto-
matic judicial immunity; thus, in addition to contributing to the lawmaking process, Escobar
was also above the law and free from prosecution. BOWDEN, supra note 18, at 30-31. Such
corruption was not limited to the Colombia political arena; in the early 1980s, the Medellfn
cartel included Prime Minister Norman Pindling of the Bahamas on their underground
payroll. Pindling offered his more deserted islands as an intermediate base for traffickers to
organize and consolidate cocaine for conversion into shuttle aircrafts headed for the United
States. In exchange for pay-offs and kickbacks, Pindling further facilitated the success of
Colombian cartels in the Bahamas by laundering money and business investments. Front-
line: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8.
23 Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14. The Cali cartel gained preferential
treatment from the Colombian police as well as American law enforcement organizations
such as the DEA by providing information concerning their nemesis, Pablo Escobar and the
Medellfn. Id.
24 See DEA BRIEFS & BACKGROUND, DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG DESCRIPTIONS,
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 2,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concem/dmgtraffickingp.html [hereinafter DRUG TRAFFICKING
IN THE UNITED STATES]. These were not the only two groups to join forces. In 1994, the
"Project Onig" investigation targeted a massive drug trafficking network involving Italian
organized crime and Colombian drug cartels. In re Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Declaration of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, CC Docket No. 97-213, 10
(Jan. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Freeh Declaration] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment
Filing System).
2 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2005: THREAT MATRIX (2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubsll/13817/13817p.pdfx. Mexico produces and smuggles
into the United States much of the marijuana and methamphetamine found in American
drug markets. Id.
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land,26 air27 and water.28 They are then distributed in major metropolitan
areas throughout the country.29
Managing an international empire of narcotics manufacturing and distri-
bution is a monumental task for the drug kingpin or cartel manager. Like
the Italian crime bosses that came before him, the drug kingpin is respon-
sible for making strategic decisions and issuing direction to his virtual
army of agents. The most significant difference from his Mafia predeces-
sors is that the kingpin always directs operations from foreign soil.30 Nu-
merous transactions are carried out simultaneously and the kingpin must
have seamless communications with his cells.31 Effective coordination of
the enterprise requires accurate transmission of information to international
cells regarding warehousing locations for loads of narcotics, contacts for
providing transportation once the narcotics arrive at a destination, and lo-
cations for delivering the profits.32
The benefits of a widespread infrastructure for cells to effectively com-
municate information with each other is compounded by the United States'
combative approach in recent decades towards South American drug traf-
ficking. President Richard Nixon first launched the "War on Drugs" '33 in
26 DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 24, at 2. The Medellin and Cali
Colombian cartels possess their own fleets of boats and aircrafts. The United States-Mexico
border is the main point of entry for cocaine smuggled into the United States; a majority of
it crosses the Southwest border, brought in by illegal aliens. Id.
27 Pablo Escobar went from stuffing ten thousand kilos of cocaine into small planes to
using stripped Boeing 727s for international narcotics smuggling. BOWDEN, supra note 18,
at 34. Small, twin-engine aircrafts were the inconspicuous means of choice for Colombian
drug traffickers. Over the course of one month, six flights could deliver up to two thousand
kilos of cocaine, worth approximately $100 million. Frontline: Drug Wars Television
Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8.
28 Escobar even built small, remote-controlled submarines to send up to two thousand
kilos of cocaine to the waters off the coast of Puerto Rico. Divers then recovered the deliv-
ery and transferred it to Miami in cartel-owned speedboats. BOWDEN, supra note 18, at 34.
29 See DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 24, at 2. Cities under the
control of Mexico-based trafficking groups for cocaine distribution include Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and more re-
cently, Atlanta. Colombian-based cocaine distribution is prominent in cities along the east-
ern seaboard such as Boston, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, and Miami. Id.
30 See Clone Phones: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Crime, 104th Cong. 11 (1997) [hereinafter Cellular Phone Fraud Hearing] (statement of
Anthony R. Bocchichio, Asst. Admin. for Operational Support, DEA). "Traditional organ-
ized crime leaders operating in places like New York, Chicago or Las Vegas called their
business shots on American soil." Id.
3' See id.
32 id.
33 Debate, The War on Drugs: Fighting Crime or Wasting Time?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1537, 1539 (2001). At a press conference shortly after his inauguration in 1971, President
Nixon called drug abuse "public enemy number one in the United States," and determined it
was "1necessary to wage a new all-out offensive." Id. Many states implemented severe drug
laws; New York's "Rockefeller Laws" featured harsh sentences for drug offenders. Id. The
Nixon administration devoted more resources to drug treatment than law enforcement.
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1971, targeting the spread of narcotics on a domestic level, while aiming to
reduce the influx and supply of narcotics from drug-producing countries."
President George H.W. Bush advanced this policy by invading Panama
with American troops to capture kingpin and Army General Manuel
Noriega, who surrendered to the DEA in January of 1990.35 Never consid-
ered victorious,36 the War on Drugs continues.37 Despite American efforts
Frontline: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8. Under Nixon's "total
war" against "the problem of dangerous drugs," federal spending went from $80 million to
over $600 million in just his first term. Id. His legacy in the War on Drugs exists in the
1973 creation of the DEA. See id. Although President Reagan did not consider domestic
drug abuse a more pressing issue than foreign policy when he took the White House in
1981, he agreed that drug abuse remained "one of the gravest problems" affecting the
United States. Id. To attack this problem, Reagan gradually adopted a harsh policy of inter-
diction. Aside from Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" social campaign directed towards the
middle class youth, the DEA formed anti-drug units like the South Florida Drug Task
Force, designed to seize and destroy narcotics in high-traffic areas such as Miami. Id. The
cost of such federal law enforcement interdiction efforts under Reagan surpassed $1 billion.
Id. The signing of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, which are best known for
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, illustrates Reagan's imprint on the drug
wars in America. See The War on Drugs: Fighting Crime or Wasting Time ? supra note 34
at 1539. This hard-line stance continued under President George H.W. Bush, who named
the War on Drugs his top domestic policy priority. He created the Office of National Drug
Control Policy in 1989, headed by the "Drug Czar," and increased military spending for
drug enforcement by fifty percent. Id. President Clinton continued the military focus of the
War on Drugs, appointing retired Army General Barry McCaffrey to the position of Drug
Czar. In August of 2000, Clinton authorized and delivered $1.3 billion in United States aid
to Colombia to fund combat helicopters and training of the Colombian military as part of
"Plan Colombia." Frontline: Drug Wars, Thirty Years of America's Drug War: A Chronol-
ogy, http:l/www.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron [hereinafter Drug Wars:
Chronology].
34 Kyle Grayson, Discourse, Identity, and the U.S. 'War on Drugs,' in CRrTCAL RE-
FLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND CORRUPTION
151-52 (Margaret E. Beare ed., 2003). Domestically, the "fashionable" drug cocaine was
targeted, and drug penalties for dealers and consumers were increased. Internationally, the
DEA identified certain nations as drug producers and traffickers, and the United States
donated military equipment to fight the cartels. The War on Drugs allowed for military
involvement in civilian law enforcement. Id.
35 Drug Wars: Chronology, supra note 33. Noriega was convicted on charges of drug
trafficking, money laundering and racketeering and was sentenced to forty years in United
States federal prison. Noriega conspired with the Colombian Medellin cartel and allowed
them to launder money and invest in enormous cocaine laboratories in Panama. Id. Noriega
was a "friend of the cartel people," and offered asylum to Escobar and the Ochoa brothers
when Colombian President Belisario Betancur sought to extradite the Medellin kingpins
following the assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the top Colombian judicial official, on
Apr. 30, 1984. Frontline: Drug Wars, Interviews,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/arenas.html (interviewing
Fernando Arenas, pilot for Medellfn kingpin Carlos Lehder).
36 See Frontline: Drug Wars, Statistics and Charts,
http://www.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontline/shows/drugs/charts/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
By the year 2000, more than sixty percent of federal inmates were serving sentences for
drug offenses. Compare this to sixteen percent of federal inmates in 1970, and twenty-four
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to stem the domestic manufacture and distribution of narcotics, the Colom-
bian drug cartels will persist so long as their nation's economy heavily
relies on its drug trafficking industry, which will continue as long as cartels
are permitted to pursue all avenues to perpetuate this lucrative business.3
B. Use of Advanced Communications in Evading Scrutiny by American
Law Enforcement
The economic efficiency of drug trafficking organizations stems largely
from the historical success that Colombian kingpins have had in identify-
ing and implementing advanced technologies for effective communication
within the cartel. 39 The attention and scrutiny that leaders of the War on
Drugs have invested in crippling the efforts of drug trafficking organiza-
tions in recent decades have forced the cartels and other drug smuggling
organizations to rely heavily on telecommunications to coordinate their
illicit operations in order to avoid law enforcement detection and prosecu-
tion.4° For example, from the 1980s to early 1990s, Colombian cartels used
pagers, creating codeword systems to convey times and locations for trans-
actions.4' Pay phones provided a virtually untraceable medium when live
voice communication was required.42 In the mid- to late-1990s, phone ar-
cades, pre-paid phone cards, and faxes became popular methods of mes-
sage transmission. 43 As the technology emerged, drug lords gradually in-
percent of federal inmates in 1980. Id. This illustrates one of the greatest failures of the War
on Drugs: "the inability to curb the demand for drugs." Deborah Amos, Drug Wars: All
Things Considered (Nat'l Pub. Radio radio broadcast Oct. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/drugwars/atccoverage.html. Drug users are statistically
more likely to end up in prison than in treatment, despite studies showing that money spent
on treatment is more effective than law enforcement in reducing drug demand. Id.
37 Grayson, supra note 34, at 153. Plan Columbia is a modem military aid package.
However, it seems to perpetuate the War on Drugs by supplying military arms and aid to
Colombian law enforcement, rather than providing for the reorganization and improvement
of the country's social structure and economic institutions. Id. See discussion supra note 33
for a brief review of the United States' contribution to Plan Colombia.
38 KELLY, supra note 1, at 76.
39 See Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14. Cali hired top engineers and
technology experts to design sophisticated communications equipment that was undetect-
able by law enforcement. The Cali kingpins often pioneered innovative uses of communica-
tions technology to successfully carry out their operations. See Cellular Phone Fraud, supra
note 30, at 11.
40 See Freeh Declaration, supra note 24 17.
41 Cellular Phone Fraud Hearing, supra note 30, at 12.
42 Id. Pay phones are still popular among drug traffickers today. Interview with Manuel
Estrella, Spanish Translator and Wire Monitor, DEA, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 26, 2006).
43 Cellular Phone Fraud Hearing, supra note 30, at 14. Pre-paid calling cards are easily
accessible and available for purchase through post offices, vending machines, and a variety
of other public sites. Resembling modem Internet caf6s, the term phone arcade describes
the prevalent foreign shops in which private phone booths are made available for public use
by paying the clerk for calls made. Calls from phone arcades tend to evade surveillance
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corporated cellular phones into their operations; they bought the phones in
lots and discarded them periodically to insulate themselves from surveil-
lance."
Globally, the drug trade ranks among the most serious outgrowths of or-
ganized crime.45 In addition to those it directly affects, drug trafficking
indirectly inflicts harm on society through violent acts such as kidnap-
pings, public turf battles, and robberies committed by drug dealers.46 Drug
trafficking generates exorbitant health care expenses and devastating ef-
fects on productivity, industry, and public safety, particularly with regard
to inner-city children and the unborn children of addicted mothers. 47 Given
the nation's efforts in combating the War on Drugs, however, United
States law enforcement remains optimistic that progressive, efficient elec-
tronic surveillance of major narcotics organizations and cartels will lead to
a decline in the debilitating effects of drug trafficking and organized
crime.48 United States law enforcement agencies generally agree that elec-
tronic surveillance may be the most important and sophisticated investiga-
tive device available in the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of
organized crime.49 In the world of drug trafficking, electronic surveillance
is often the only method available to intercept communications between
the drug kingpin and his highest officers within the crime enterprise.5"
because the caller's identity is hidden behind his cash transaction with the storefront clerk.
Id.
44 Id. at 15.
45 It has been called "the linchpin of transnational crime." Grayson, supra note 34, at
145.
46 Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, Y 17. Medellfn kingpin Pablo Escobar first gained
power and notoriety in 1971 when he kidnapped Diego Echavarria, a conservative factory
owner who was known for mistreating the poor working class. BOWDEN, supra note 18, at
20-21. This act made Escobar a hero in the Medelln slums, and other such "acts of charity"
contributed to the level of prominence Escobar reached in the following decades. Id. at 21.
47 Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, 17. These societal costs are representative of
organized crime, Freeh explains, and "extremely harmful to American business and indus-
try," which additionally bears the price tag that accompanies high consumer costs, low
employment, and underpayment of taxes. Id 15.
48 Id. [[ 9-10.
49 id. 9.
50 Id. 18. An early example of the success of electronic surveillance is found in the
events surrounding the capture and death of Pablo Escobar. By the early 1990s, Escobar
was "the most wanted fugitive in the world," and American law enforcement as well as
various Colombian factions wanted him dead. BOWDEN, supra note 18, at 237. Using a
portable eavesdropping and direction-finder device given to Colombian law enforcement's
electronic-surveillance unit by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), agent Hugo Marti-
nez attempted to locate Escobar by tracking his daily phone calls from his hideout. Id. at
206. The device monitored the frequencies used for conversation and triangulated the target
signal of the call, locating it within an area of the city. Id. Finally, on December 2, 1993,
Colombian law enforcement agents, with the help of the CIA's surveillance device, were
able to pinpoint Escobar's hideout in a two-story row house in south-central Medellfn,
Colombia, and Pablo Escobar was shot and killed. Id at 246-49.
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III. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVANCEMENTS
A. Transition to a Digital World Signifies a Shift in Surveillance Capacity
A brief and recent history of the telecommunications industry in the
United States explains why the War on Drugs' electronic and telecommu-
nications surveillance of drug trafficking organizations has faced consider-
able obstacles. Prior to 1984, American Telephone & Telegraph ("AT&T")
carried a sizeable majority of the nation's local and long distance tele-
communications services.5 Because of its domination of the industry,
AT&T had the advantage of employing a uniform system of equipment
and analog technology. 52 Accordingly, law enforcement agents easily con-
ducted electronic surveillance of private telephone landlines by accessing
the "local loop"53 of lines between the carrier and the private home or of-
fice.54 AT&T's 1984 dissolution complicated the previously straightfor-
ward process for law enforcement 55 in that it gave rise to an innovative but
crowded telecommunications industry with thousands of different service
providers.56 The replacement of analog technology with digital technology
exacerbated this problem because computers routed calls outside of the
local loop and through other communications networks.57 Once this oc-
cuffed, only the network carrier possessed the appropriate equipment to
intercept the "call-identifying information' 's8 needed for electronic surveil-
lance.59
Traditionally, law enforcement used several methods of legally-
authorized electronic surveillance to gather evidence in criminal investiga-
tions.6° Such efforts are often directed at monitoring a suspect's operations
over telecommunications lines. In order to ensure the legality of such
51 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Declaration of Supervi-
sory Special Agent Dave Yarbrough, CC Docket No. 97-213, [ 5 (Jan. 27, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Yarbrough Declaration] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
52 Id.
53 Local loop refers to the connection between a telecommunications company's central
office for a particular locality to the telephone or modem lines in the subscriber's home or
office. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERI-
CAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PoLicY IN THE INTERNET AGE 33 (2005).
54 Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, 6. Using a Dialed Number Recorder
("DNR"), law enforcement was able to collect the entire record of all communications and
dialing information transmitted over the lines during a call, as well as the duration and
status of the call. Id. U[ 6-7.
" Id. 1[1f8, 11.
56 Id. 8.
57 id.
58 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
59 Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, 11.
60 Id. 3.
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monitoring, law enforcement agents must, pursuant to the Omnibus Act,
61
apply for a court-authorized wire intercept of a suspect's communications
occurring over specified media.62 Having secured a warrant to intercept and
install telephonic intercept hardware, the law enforcement officer may use
an origin-identifying device63 or wiretap, which monitors the actual content
of the communications.6
B. Traffickers Capitalize on Communications Advancements to Evade
Surveillance
Modem drug trafficking organizations have exploited the transition from
analog to digital communications, investing heavily in the latest techno-
logical innovations in order to avoid detection. As a result, United States
law enforcement agencies face an arduous task in tracking their enter-
prises.
1. Basic Telecommunication Methods Employed By Drug Trafficking
Organizations
Agents in large and powerful cartels use payphones liberally while over-
seas or in foreign countries because they are typically free from electronic
surveillance by law enforcement.65 Additionally, two-way pagers allow for
rapid communication and protection from possible law enforcement sur-
veillance better suited to telephone-line communications. 66 Push-to-talk, or
walkie-talkie communications, offers a quicker and more cost efficient
two-way international radio connection for users. 67 Pre-paid calling cards
61 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197.
62 Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, 2 n. 1.
63 Examples of such equipment are trap-and-trace and pen register devices. See infra
notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
64 Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, 2 n.1. "Wiretapping" refers to the process that
uses court-ordered authorization to intercept the contents of wire or electronic communica-
tions. Id.
65 Interview with Manuel Estrella, supra note 42. According to Mr. Estrella, the use of
pre-paid phone cards among drug traffickers also has not significantly declined since the
1990s. Id.
66 Cellular Phone Fraud Hearing, supra note 30, at 12. Pagers, especially two-way
communicators, are safe means of communication because they allow for the use of cryptic
codes to convey information such as location and strategy, rather than potentially-
incriminating number and voice communication. Id.
67 Elisa Batista, "Push-to-Talk" Spreading Fast, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 24, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,60554,00.html. Sprint and Nextel made digital
cellular, two-way radio and text-numeric paging phones accessible to the general public
with its "Direct Connect" service release in 1996. Id. Due to competition from carriers such
as Verizon, which released its own push-to-talk service in August of 2003, the price for
push-to-talk communications has reached a point that does not much exceed an average
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also remain an effective alternative for criminals seeking to evade elec-
tronic surveillance since law enforcement can no longer intercept the "post
cut-through" dialed digits. 68 Pre-paid cellular phones, a more recent inno-
vation, are growing in popularity among drug traffickers because they are
disposable and difficult to trace. 69 A drug kingpin or major cartel officer
may also use a satellite phone, which provides coverage in all ocean areas,
air routes, and landmasses. Though these phones are extremely expensive,
calls can be made anywhere in the world;7 ° and because they are typically
used in conjunction with pre-paid phone cards, satellite phones are virtu-
ally impossible to trace.
Other features added to cellular phones in the past few years, including
call waiting, call forwarding, conference calling, three-way calling, and
call transfer, may be engaged by criminal drug traffickers to conceal in-
criminating conversations. 7 For example, criminals use call forwarding to
redirect calls outside of the same line loop, rendering the information vir-
tually untraceable.72 By manipulating conference call holding features,
agents may evade surveillance while coordinating criminal activities from
remote locations or even prison.73 More basic techniques can be just as
difficult to trace; criminals avoid direct conversation by first employing
monthly cellular phone plan. Id. By requiring that customers subscribe to AT&T Wireless
and its partner companies providing communications abroad, companies like Fastmobile
Inc. have introduced instant push-to-talk communications worldwide. Id. In addition to
push-to-talk, the service offers advanced messaging features like instant video and voice
messages. Id.
68 See Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, 49-50. Named for the intermediate
carrier, usually an 800 number service that prompts the caller to continue dialing, post cut-
through dialed digits were once traceable by law enforcement under the AT&T setup. Id.
69 Cellular Phone Fraud Hearing, supra note 30, at 14. Wire monitors who are receiv-
ing a feed from a pre-paid cellular phone are able to obtain the number of the phone making
the call, but unlike cellular phones from a major service, monitors are unable to tell where
the calls are coming from. Interview with Manuel Estrella, supra note 42.
70 Interview with Manuel Estrella, supra note 42. According to Mr. Estrella, the high
price of these phones makes them rare, but they are growing in popularity among criminal
organized crime members. Id.
71 Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, 9. For example, Manuel Estrella believes
that he sometimes monitors a call in which one of these procedures has been implemented,
because he can only hear one side of the conversation. Interview with Manuel Estrella,
supra note 42.
72 Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, 10.
73 Id. 1l 17. The originator of a conference call is able to place one or more parties on
hold while connecting with additional parties, and also is able to drop from the call while it
continues. Id. 14. This poses the particular problem to law enforcement of not being able
to identify or distinguish which specific criminal party was completely dropped from the
conference call, or merely placed on hold during the conference call. Id. 17. This infor-
mation is vital when law enforcement is attempting to implicate a conspirator in drug traf-
ficking operations; law enforcement must be able to prove that a conspirator was present
during the conversation and heard or made statements furthering the crime. Freeh Declara-
tion, supra note 24, 7 21.B.
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pre-established ring signals to convey messages to each other. Then, they
direct incoming calls to their cellular phone's voice-mailbox, only to re-
trieve the messages from an outside public telephone.74 Finally, instant
messaging services are becoming a medium of choice among criminals
because communication is rapid and there is no law enforcement technol-
ogy to monitor the correspondence.75
2. Fraudulent Practices
As if the methods of otherwise legal cellular communications were not
difficult enough to monitor, law enforcement surveillance of communica-
tion in a drug trafficking organization becomes extremely difficult when
illegal measures such as "counterfeit fraud' 76 are put into practice. Cellular
phone cloning, a type of counterfeit fraud, became very popular among
technologically advanced criminal networks in the mid-1 990s.77 This pro-
cedure uses electronic wire scanners to record civilian cellular phone iden-
tification numbers, allowing the criminal to program these numbers into
his own cellular phones for use.78 The entire process takes a matter of min-
utes, after which the cloned cell phone, using the pirated identification
numbers, can be used to make or receive calls independent of the original
cellular phone.79 A related method of counterfeit fraud is called tumbler
phone-cloning, wherein the criminal stores a bulk of previously pirated
cellular phone identification numbers into a phone.80 When the criminal
wishes to make a call, he cycles through any number of identification
numbers, and the call goes through as if the original phone is dialing.81
This practice thwarts traditional law enforcement intercept devices, which
stop recording information when they are no longer receiving data from a
specific line.82 Finally, subscription fraud is a rare but very effective prac-
tice employed by traffickers who have an agent working for a telecommu-
74 Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, 1 21.D.
75 Interview with Manuel Estrella, supra note 42. When monitoring wire intercepts of
telephones, Mr. Estrella occasionally hears one party inform the other one that he will send
him an instant message with other information. Id.
76 Cellular Telephone Fraud Hearing, supra note 30. Counterfeit fraud, also known as
cellular phone piracy, includes cellular phone cloning, "tumbler-phone cloning," and "sub-
scription fraud." Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. Criminal agents stake out "high-traffic areas, such as airports, bridges, tunnels or
office complexes" and use the electronic scanners to obtain the Mobile Identification Num-
ber and Electronic Serial Number from private cellular calls. Then, software is used to




82 Id. at 13. See also Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, 1 21.F for similar limitations on
the scope of law enforcement.
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nications carrier. This inside agent activates service for fraudulent users or
cloned cellular phones. 3
3. Negative Effects on Law Enforcement and the Telecommunications In-
dustry
The damage to law enforcement efforts by such counterfeit telecommu-
nications fraud practices is exponential. First, calls from a cloned phone
are generally untraceable because drug trafficking agents use different pi-
rated identification numbers for each call, stymieing law enforcement ef-
forts as they obtain the required surveillance authorization, only to find that
the agent has already changed to a new number.84 Second, when traffickers
pirate a consumer's cellular phone information, the charge for the calls,
which are usually international, fall upon the consumer. The consumers
then complain to their telecommunications company, who usually absorb
the charges. 5 Thus, the telecommunications industry stands to save large
amounts of money if it joins forces with United States law enforcement to
shut down the abuse of the airwaves perpetrated by criminal networks and
counterfeit fraud artists.
IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION
The wheels of electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies were
first set in motion by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.86 Title III of the Omnibus Act provided licensing grants as well as
legislative limits for electronic surveillance for use in criminal investiga-
tions. Having considered the implications of freely-conducted surveillance
with regard to individual rights, Congress carefully balanced the govern-
ment's law enforcement with the protection of civil liberties. Aside from
requiring probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, the Act requires
that law enforcement may only utilize the interception of wire and oral
communications by electronic surveillance in limited circumstances relat-
ing to criminal communications. 7 In addition, each application by law
enforcement to intercept wire or oral communications must also be re-
83 Cellular Telephone Fraud Hearing, supra note 30, at 13.
84 See generally Id.
85 Id. at 13.
86 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (2000).
87 § 2516, 82 Stat. at 211-14. Specifically, a Title III warrant based on probable cause
may be issued to law enforcement only: (a) when other investigative techniques failed or
appear to have failed, or are too dangerous to attempt; (b) for the investigation of serious,
statutorily-specified felony offenses, and (c) for the interception of criminal communica-
tions. Id. § 2518.
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viewed and authorized by a designated Department of Justice or state offi-
cial before it may be presented for approval by a federal judge.
88
A. Modernization of the Omnibus Act and Title III
In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")
89
amended the Omnibus Act to incorporate modem innovations of advanced
computer and telecommunications technologies. 90 The ECPA provides for
electronic surveillance through "pen registers" 91 and "trap-and-trace" de-
vices,92 which identify the origin of wire or electronic communication di-
rected to a facility under surveillance. Though these devices are much less
intrusive than wiretaps and do not reveal the actual contents of any com-
munication, they are effective when used by law enforcement to establish a
link between parties to a criminal communication. 93 Congress preserved
individual privacy rights by requiring that prior court approval be obtained
before a pen register may be used to intercept electronic communications, 94
even though the Supreme Court held that use of pen registers does not
qualify as a search.95
Section 2519 of the Omnibus Act requires reports to issue to the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts concerning intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communications. 96 Every April, the director of that of-
fice is to submit "a full and complete report," called the "Wiretap Report,"
88 § 2518, 82 Stat. at 218.
89 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000).
90 Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, I 3-4.
91 18 U.S.C. § 3124. A pen register is "'a mechanical device that records the numbers
dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications .... .- Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 735 n.1 (1979) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1
(1977)). A pen register is "' usually installed at a central telephone facility [and] records on
a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line' to which it is attached." Id. at 735 n. 1 (quot-
ing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
92 § 3124. "Trap-and-trace" devices provide information concerning the incoming call's
origin and location. Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, U 3-4.
93 Freeh Declaration, supra note 24, 6. The information provided by these devices
contributes to the evidence required for a Title III court order. Id.
94 § 3121.
9' Smith, 442 U.S. 745. The Court upheld as constitutional the warrantless installation of
a pen register by police to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at the defendant's
home. The Court concluded that installation of the device was not a Fourth Amendment
search and, therefore, no warrant was required. Id. But cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (holding that the electronic listening and recording device attached to outside of
a public telephone by federal law enforcement agents constitutes a search and requires a
warrant).
96 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2519,
82 Stat. 197, 222.
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to Congress regarding the numbers of intercepts and includes detailed de-
scriptions of each intercept.97 In addition, the Wiretap Report features a
variety of tables and charts diagramming the description, nature, fre-
quency, and costs of the intercepts.98
1. The 2005 Wiretap Report
Examination of the most recent 2005 Wiretap Report reveals the extent
to which law enforcement has utilized telecommunications and electronics
to infiltrate drug trafficking and the illegal narcotics trade. "Portable de-
vices" are the overwhelming leader in court-authorized intercepts among
telecommunications channels,99 and "narcotics" tallies the most court-
authorized intercepts in the division of major criminal offenses.'0° In the
past decade there has been a remarkable increase in the number of inter-
cepts of portable communications devices involved in narcotics investiga-
tions.'0 ' The 1694 orders authorizing intercepts in 2005 led to 4674 arrests
and 776 convictions.
10 2
B. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
Following the 1984 breakup of AT&T and the ensuing digital revolution
enabling telecommunications subscribers to manage their private services
in unprecedented ways, law enforcement recognized that cooperation with
the nation's telecommunications carriers was critical to the continued in-
terception of call-identifying information. 0 3 Congress also intervened to
support this cooperation, passing the Communications Assistance for Law
97 Id.
98 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS: THE WIRETAP REPORT (2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap05/contents.html [hereinafter THE WIRETAP REPORT].
9 Id at 15-17 tbl. 2. Portable communications devices constituted 1610 intercepts out of
1773 total authorized intercepts for 2005 at the state and local level. Id. Examples of other
channels for which intercepts were also authorized include personal residences (fifty-seven
intercepts) and businesses (twenty-one intercepts). Id.
'0o Id. at 18-20 tbl. 3. Narcotics constituted 1433 intercepts out of 1773 total authorized
intercepts for 2005 from state and local levels. The next closest offense was racketeering
with ninety-four total authorized intercepts. Id.
oI Id. at 30 tbl. 7. Table 7 traces intercepts reported from 1995-2005. It shows the num-
ber of "portable device" intercepts, non-existent before 2000, originating at 719, and "per-
sonal residence" as the next closest with 244. The table also shows narcotics as the leading
major offense specified and marks the gradual increase in intercepts in that area for the past
ten years. Id.
1o Id. at 27-29 tbl. 6. Such positive results not only validate law enforcement's growing
reliance on wire intercepts, but they also seem to justify the average cost of a court-
authorized intercept order: $55,530. Id. at 24-26 tbl. 5. See supra text accompanying notes
48-50 for a discussion of the critical relationship between electronic surveillance and the
investigation and prosecution of organized crime operations.
103 Yarbrough Declaration, supra note 51, 5, 8, 9, 11.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA") °4 to foil the use of the nation's tele-
communications systems by organized crime networks. This Act uniformly
addressed the nation's telecommunications carriers, °5 requiring them to
design or modify their systems to meet specific assistance capability re-
quirements that would ensure easy execution of court-ordered surveil-
lance.'06 CALEA requires that carriers use up-to-date equipment, and that
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment make CALEA-compliant
modifications and updates available to the carriers."°7 Adopting a custom-
ary standard unique to the telecommunications industry, CALEA also calls
for compliance with "publicly available technical requirements.' 0 8
CALEA solicits the Federal Communications Commission ("Commis-
sion") to identify such publicly available standards, and to clarify compli-
ance and capability requirements where the plain language of the legisla-
tion is deliberately general to allow for flexibility and interpretation."°
104 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279 (2000).
105 § 102. CALEA defines "telecommunications carrier" as "a person or entity engaged
in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier
for hire." Id.
106 § 103(a). This section sets forth the capability requirements with which telecommuni-
cations carriers must comply to support law enforcement in court-ordered electronic sur-
veillance. Carriers have the responsibility to ensure that their networks are capable of: (1)
"expeditiously isolating ...all wire and electronic communications transmitted by the
carrier within a service area," (2) "expeditiously isolating" call-identifying information of a
target (origin, direction, destination, and termination of a call) that is reasonably available to
the carrier; (3) providing such intercepted communications and call-identifying information
to law enforcement; and (4) carrying out intercepts so that targets are not made aware of
electronic surveillance by the government. Id.
107 § 106. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice have worked to
facilitate this process and lessen the costs for implementation by telecommunications carri-
ers. In January 2000, for example, the FBI established a Flexible Deployment Program
designed to facilitate CALEA compliance among telecommunications carriers. The FBI
reviews information from the carrier in order to determine whether it will support the car-
rier's petition for a compliance extension filed with the Commission. In re The Communi-
cations Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Section 107(c) Extension of Capability Re-
quirements, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 3672, 5 (Feb. 28, 2002). Additionally, in 2000, the FBI
and DOJ reached an agreement with Lucent technologies in which the telecommunications
equipment supplier would issue software to telecommunications carriers to remove any
technological impediments that prevent compliance with CALEA, making lawfully-
authorized electronic surveillance more simple and cost effective. Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Dep't of Justice and FBI Reach CALEA Agreement with Lucent Technologies and
Bell Atl. Network Servs. (Apr. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/April/202jmd.htm.
"' § 107 (a)(2).
109 § 107. If these publicly available industry standards fail to issue technical require-
ments or standards, or if an agency or individual petitions the Commission identifying
deficient industry standards, the Commission is responsible for establishing technical stan-
dards. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,999 (May 2,
2002) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 22, 24, 64). Section 102 of CALEA delegates to the Com-
mission the authority to establish findings which identify telecommunications carriers who
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1. Who Must Comply? The Role of the Commission
A review of the services and carriers which the Commission determined
to be subject to CALEA reveals the Commission's pivotal role in the law
enforcement goal of efficient electronic surveillance. In August of 1999,
the Commission designated six items from the DOJ and FBI "punch-list"
subject to CALEA compliance.10 One of these punch-list items, "dialed
digit extraction," provides to law enforcement the digits dialed after the
initial connection in pre-paid phone card services, when the user is
prompted by the second carrier."' Also on the list is "subject-initiated dial-
ing and signaling," which provides law enforcement with access to call
forwarding and other features that enable users to reroute calls outside of a
single loop."2 The Commission further required compliance regarding "in-
band and out-of-band signaling," which provides law enforcement with
information regarding network signals and voice and text messages that
criminals use to correspond." 3 Finally, the Commission adopted capability
requirements for conference calling, such as "subject-initiated conference
calls"1 4 and instances of "party hold/join/drop.""' 5
must comply with CALEA. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). Section 105 requires the Commission
to establish regulations of security and integrity regarding the acquisition of a wire inter-
cept. Id. § 1004.
110 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Or-
der, 14 F.C.C.R. 16794 (Aug. 26, 1999), affid, In re Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Order on Remand, 17 F.C.C.R. 6896 (Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Third
Report and Order]. The punch list features electronic surveillance capabilities that the FBI
and DOJ requested the Commission consider in regard to CALEA compliance in order for
electronic surveillance to keep pace with changes in telecommunications. Id. The Third
Report and Order withstood challenge on remand, and was codified. See Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,999 (May 2, 2002) (codified at 47
C.F.R. pts. 22, 24, 64).
"ll Third Report and Order, supra note 110, T 112. Also referred to as "post cut-through
digits," this procedure is most commonly found in the use of calling cards, when the caller
dials an 800 number and follows prompts to dial a destination number. Id. Since the switch-
over from AT&T analog to digital telecommunications, the destination number dialed had
not been available for intercept by law enforcement. See discussion supra note 68.
112 Third Report and Order, supra note 110, 76. Call forwarding is a feature that per-
mits users to redirect calls, so that communications transmitted to that line may be transmit-
ted to a different physical location and through a different wire loop. This practice was
previously immune to electronic surveillance by law enforcement. Yarbrough Declaration,
supra note 51, 10.
13 Third Report and Order, supra note 110, 83. This requirement allows notification to
be sent to the law enforcement agency whenever any "network message," such as a busy
signal, call waiting signal, voicemail or text message notification, is sent to or from the
subject under electronic surveillance. Id. See supra text accompanying note 74.
114 Third Report and Order, supra note 110, 58. The adoption of this element of the
punch list allowed law enforcement to monitor conversation content of all parties to a con-
ference call, including parties placed on hold and parties dropped entirely from the confer-
ence call. Id.
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More recently, the Commission's role has been to ensure that CALEA
adapts to encompass emerging innovations in the telecommunications in-
dustry. In 2004, the Commission began requiring the CALEA-compliance
of commercial mobile radio and wireless "push-to-talk" services 16 like
Nextel and Verizon.1 7 Most recently, the Commission expanded CALEA
authority to include broadband Internet providers and "broadband teleph-
ony,"' 8 the transmission or switching of voice communications using the
broadband medium, more commonly known as interconnected Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP"). 1' Prior to 2006, the Commission expressed
concern that a requirement that all broadband Internet services comply
with CALEA would fail to satisfy the three public interest factors.1 ° But,
in its most recent CALEA order, the Commission determined that these
broadband Internet services should be subject to CALEA because they
qualify as telecommunications carriers'2 ' under the two-pronged Substan-
tial Replacement Provision ("SRP").12 2 Specifically, the Commission con-
115 Id. 68. This capability identifies all parties to a conversation at all times, and sends
notification when a party is placed on hold, is released or disconnected from the call, or is
reactivated from hold status. Id. See discussion supra note 73 regarding law enforcement's
great need to identify the parties in a criminal conference call.
116 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,999 (May 2,
2002) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
117 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
118 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access
and Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, 19 F.C.C.R. 15676,
35 (Aug. 4, 2004) [hereinafter CALEA NPRM]. The Commission defines broadband as
"those services having the capability to report ... speeds in excess of 200 kilobits per sec-
ond in the last mile." Id. 1 35 According to the Commission, cable modem, satellite, and
wireless are all forms of broadband Internet access providers. Id. 37.
119 Due to its speed, convenience, and efficiency, VoIP is predicted to replace today's
basic set up of local exchange services. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, with the FBI
and DEA File Petition for Expedited Rulemaking with the FCC Requesting Resolution to
Issues Surrounding the Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act (CALEA) (Jan. 28, 2004). The Commission recently decreed that broadband
Internet access providers and VoIP services are given until May 14, 2007 to become
CALEA compliant, and must submit periodic reports to the Commission to ensure that they
will meet the deadline. In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and
Broadband Access and Services, Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 5360, 1, 8 (May 12, 2006) [hereinafter Second Report and Order]
("[AIlI carriers providing facilities-based broadband Internet access and interconnected
VoIP services must be in compliance with section 103 of CALEA by May 14, 2007."). See
also Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (aff'd the order which
requires VolP and broadband Internet services to be CALEA compliant).
20 See infra text accompanying note 127. The Commission argued that requiring com-
pliance in "underserved" areas would negatively impact the protection of competition and
the development of new technologies. CALEA NPRM, supra note 118, 49.
121 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 102,
108 Stat. 4279, 4280 (1994).
122 § 102(8)(b)(ii) (The Substantial Replacement Provision provides the Commission
with a test to determine whether a service provider qualifies as a telecommunications carrier
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cluded that broadband Internet provision satisfies the first prong of the
SRP because it replaces a substantial proportion of the local telephone ex-
change service used for dial-up Internet service. 123 The Commission also
concluded that VoIP services satisfy the second prong of the SRP, which
classifies any service as a telecommunications carrier and thus subject to
CALEA whenever such classification furthers the public interest. 124 Be-
cause it is in the public interest to assist law enforcement in its ability to
lawfully conduct electronic surveillance in the face of a rapidly progressing
telecommunications industry, the Commission classified VoIP as tele-
communications subject to CALEA.'25
2. The Effective Balance Integrated in CALEA
CALEA is particularly effective because of the elements of reasonable-
ness imported from its statutory predecessor, the Omnibus Act. Similar to
the Omnibus Act regulation, CALEA only permits electronic surveillance
assistance from telecommunications providers pursuant to a court order.'
26
In addition, the statutory directive for the Commission's implementation of
CALEA is composed of three public interest factors: promoting fair com-
petition, encouraging the development of new technologies, and protecting
public safety and national security. 2 7 Thus, CALEA balances the business
endeavors of telecommunications carriers with those of law enforcement
by prohibiting law enforcement agencies from impeding any innovative
development or manufacture of equipment features. 128 Furthermore, direct-
ing the Commission to determine whether compliance would be problem-
atic for a carrier, CALEA instructs the Commission to consider "cost-
effective methods" of capability assistance 12 9 and United States policy to-
ward industry: to stimulate innovation and technology. 30 Consistent with
this policy, telecommunications carriers are only required to turn over call-
subject to CALEA. The service is a telecommunications carrier, under the first prong of the
test, if it "is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange ser-
vice," and under the second prong of the test, if "it is in the public interest to deem such a
person or entity to be a telecommunications carrier .... Id.
123 CALEA NPRM, supra note 118, 1 37.
124 Id.
125 id.
126 § 105. See also supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for discussion of Title III
of Omnibus Act.
127 CALEA NPRM, supra note 118, 1 49.
128 § 103.
129 § 109. This determination is made after the Commission weighs the financial re-
sources of the telecommunications carrier and the effect that compliance will have on the
carrier's competition. Id.
"0 § 109(b)(1)(G) (dictating that aside from considering burdens on the carriers imposed
by compliance, the Commission is encouraged to facilitate new and public technological
innovation).
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identifying information when it is "reasonably available" to the provider,1
3 1
and then only after "a reasonable time and conditions" specified by the
court.'32 Finally, CALEA authorizes the Attorney General to pay telecom-
munications carriers for all reasonable costs accrued in direct association
with compliance measures.
33
3. CALEA 's Pursuit of Flexibility Leaves Room for Minor Guideline Modi-
fications
Despite the constructive elements, the current CALEA framework suf-
fers from shortcomings that may leave law enforcement powerless to de-
tect certain kinds of criminal communications. First, the statute's reason-
able balance and flexibility standard does not enable the Commission to
guarantee full and swift compliance. Under the "safe harbor" provision of
CALEA, a telecommunications carrier attempting to comply with the ca-
pability requirements may petition the Commission for unlimited two-year
extensions of the compliance deadline.'34 Thus, while the eighteen month
timetable the Commission established for VolP providers in August of
2005 may seem reasonable to allow providers time to achieve compliance,
criminal groups can continue to exploit the services of Internet voice
communications providers who petition for multiple extensions. Perhaps in
recognition of this loophole, the Commission recently declared that all
carriers are obliged to become CALEA-compliant, and established a fixed
timetable for compliance of broadband providers subject to CALEA by
May 14, 2007,135 while significantly restricting the safe harbor provisions
available to all other carriers.
136
But some flaws in their implementation of CALEA remain problematic.
In particular, the Commission has not yet enforced CALEA compliance
with regard to computer instant messaging services. These services are
becoming a popular channel through which drug traffickers may coordi-
nate illicit action quickly and undetected. 137 Furthermore, subjecting this
method of communication to CALEA compliance would likely pass the
two-pronged Substantial Replacement Provision test under the statute.
138
The first prong is satisfied because instant messaging is an electronic
131 § 103.
132 § 108.
133 § 109. This provision was included because legislators recognized that "some existing
equipment, services or features will have to be retrofitted" and costs will be incurred when
telecommunications providers modify "existing equipment, services or features to comply
with the capability requirements." H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 12 (1994).
134 § 107.
135 Second Report and Order, supra note 119, 111, 8.
136 Id. 27-37.
137 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
138 § 102. See discussion supra note 122.
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communications service that, because it is speedy and inexpensive, may
constitute at least a temporary replacement for a portion of the local tele-
phone exchange service for many people. The second prong of the provi-
sion is also fulfilled because it would likely be in the public interest to
classify this service as a telecommunications service for law enforcement
purposes. Although the Commission appears to be taking a more proactive
approach, as indicated in their recent restrictions on compliance safe har-
bors, the pervasive use of technological innovations in communications by
organized crime operators requires that the Commission continue to ex-
pand the reach of CALEA to allow effective law enforcement interdiction.
V. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE BALANCE OF INDIVID-
UAL RIGHTS
Expanding electronic surveillance to virtually all popular cellular phone
and Internet channels of communications under CALEA is a natural and
necessary progression considering both the drug smuggling activities coor-
dinated over those telecommunications lines, as well as the devastating
impact of narcotics infiltration on American society. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to ignore the fact that the campaign for stricter compliance with
CALEA could compromise individual privacy rights for average, law-
abiding Americans. 39 Regardless of the positive impact that electronic
surveillance pursuant to CALEA has on inner cities and communities as a
whole, it is likely that many individuals would strongly object to the possi-
ble release of personal information to law enforcement. Although Title III
prohibits surveillance of non-criminal communications,"4 it is problematic
that there is no public accountability to ensure that private, non-criminal
communications remain private. In assessing these public interest and pri-
vacy concerns, it is worth considering them in the context of the War on
Terror 14' and the controversial steps taken by the current administration to
combat terrorism.
139 This sentiment has been noted by the FCC: "An approach like the one we adopt today
is not without legal risk." In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and
Broadband Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,989, 15,041 (Sept. 23, 2005) (Statement of Comm'r Kathleen
Q. Abernathy), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-
153A3.pdf. ("An approach like the one we adopt today is not without legal risk.").
'40 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000). See also sources cited supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
141 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [hereinafter President
Bush Sept. 20, 2001 Address]. The modern war against terrorism was born on Sept. 11,
2001, when terrorists hijacked planes and used them as weapons to attack New York City
and Washington, D.C. See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War:
Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack, WASH.
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A. Organized Crime Today: "New Mafia" Trafficking Meets Worldwide
Terrorism
1. Organization and Infrastructure
The fight against drug trafficking and organized crime draws many par-
allels to the War on Terror in which this country has been engaged since
2001.142 Just as drug traffickers became "the new Mafia" at the end of the
twentieth century,'43 terrorist organizations have carved out a unique niche
in the vast landscape of organized crime in the twenty-first century.'" The
harm to the United States from drug trafficking is inflicted by an enemy
kingpin at a location outside of the United States. The kingpin employs
cells in countries around the world to carry out his goals, which are ac-
complished by preying on the weaknesses of American citizens and jeop-
ardizing their safety.'45 Similarly, a terrorist organization may consist of
hundreds of individuals operating worldwide, who carry out the missions
coordinated by the leader.' 46 The Medellfn cartel was able to secure and
POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A01. President George W. Bush was informed of the attack on the
World Trade Center while reading to a class of second-grade children in Sarasota, Florida.
He later described his thoughts upon hearing the news of the attack: "They had declared
war on us, and I made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war." Id. In a
televised address from the Oval Office the night of Sept. 11, the President's first televised
broadcast regarding "the war against terrorism," he stated to the American public: "I've
directed ... our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible
and to bring [the perpetrators] to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists
who committed these acts and those who harbor them." President George W. Bush, State-
ment by the President in his Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html. The perpetrators
were identified and revealed to America as a collection of terrorist organizations called Al
Qaeda. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Ameri-
can People (Sept. 20, 2001).
142 See sources cited supra note 141.
143 See discussion supra Part II.A..
144 President Bush underscored this notion: "Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to
crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world-and imposing its
radical beliefs on people everywhere." President Bush Sept. 20, 2001 Address.
145 Grayson, supra note 34, at 147.
146 See Balz & Woodward, supra note 141, at A01. The Islamic Jihad movement em-
ploys thousands of terrorists in more than sixty countries. President Bush Sept. 20 Address,
supra note 141. For example, Al Qaeda is based out of Afghanistan, but its missions are
transmitted to its soldiers worldwide. Specifically, Al Qaeda employs fighters and trainers
throughout Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Egypt, and
Libya among other nations. PROFILE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1997), reprinted in AMERICA
CONFRONTS TERRORISM 172 (John Prados ed., 2002) [hereinafter PROFILE]. Likewise, the
Medellin and Cali drug cartels were headed by kingpins in Colombia, with smugglers and
various agents carrying out functions internationally. Whereas the Cali kingpins orches-
trated the smuggling of narcotics covertly, Al Qaeda's very public operations, including
frequent broadcasts of its extremist goals and missions in speeches delivered through the
mass media on videotape, are reminiscent of the Medellfn cartel's public demonstrations of
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maintain power in the 1980s because of its willingness to overtly employ
terrorism techniques to remove threats of extradition, and to force the Co-
lombian government to withdraw implementation of its drug policy. 14' The
decline of the Medellin during the early 1990s was due in part to the rise of
the rival Cali cartel, which also benefited from terrorist techniques, specifi-
cally with regard to structural communication.
4 8
2. Debilitating Effects of Organized Crime on Government Efficiency and
the American People
Terrorism threatens American security and freedom in a way that is
closely mirrored by the formidable threat to the health and well-being of
American citizens brought on by the ills of drug proliferation and smug-
gling. The far-reaching impact of drugs and organized crime fashioned
drug trafficking into a "legitimate national security issue."'149 Today, terror-
ism is a predominant concern of the American public, perhaps the biggest
threat to national security, and it represents one of the highest priority is-
sues for the current Administration. 5 Not unlike the War on Drugs, threats
violence and power. Frontline: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8.
In August 1996, Al Qaeda founder and terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden issued state-
ments to the press detailing the group's goals, which included liberating Muslim holy sites
and supporting Islamic militant groups around the world. PROFILE, supra note 146, at 172.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, bin Laden publicly threatened further harm against
the United States and the West. John Prados, Osama bin Laden, in AMERICA CONFRONTS
TERRORISM 161, 167 (John Prados ed., 2002). On October 7, 2001, bin Laden stated that a
group of Muslim extremists was blessed with the responsibility "to destroy America," and
called on every Muslim to "rise and defend his religion." OSAMA BIN LADEN, BIN LADEN
STATEMENT, OCT. 7, 2001: "THE SwoRD FELL" (2001), reprinted in AMERICA CONFRONTS
TERRORISM 12-13 (John Prados ed., 2002).
147 Frontline: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8. From the mid-
to late-1980s, Medellfn guerillas threatened and killed proponents of extradition, including
Colombian national justice ministers, politicians, law enforcement officials, and journalists.
The cartel also financed random public bombings that deteriorated public morale and im-
posed a culture of death and destruction on Colombian citizens. Id.
148 Drug Wars: Colombian Traffickers, supra note 14. The Cali cartel was a model of
efficiency because of its use of terrorist group techniques. For example, Cali separated its
many workers into units or cells who received orders on a primarily individual and covert
basis, with each cell knowing very little about the other employees and their duties. Id.
149 KELLY, supra note 1, at 100. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the priority given
to the War on Drugs as a domestic policy issue.
150 Terrorism has become the top priority issue for the DOJ. See RICHARD A. CLARKE,
AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 256 (2004). Prior to Sept. 11, as
the perceived threat to national security from terrorism was not great, there was no signifi-
cant counterterrorism spending. Id. This was complemented and perhaps fostered by limited
public knowledge of global terrorism, and low public interest regarding counterterrorism
programs. John Prados, Introduction, in AMERICA CONFRONTS TERRORISM, supra note 146,
at 3. The attacks of September 11 made the terrorism issue personal to Americans, and thus
the war on terrorism became supported by public demand. Id. at 4.
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from terrorist organizations all over the globe command a significant
amount of United States government resources in the War on Terror. 5 '
3. Government Responses and the Public's Reaction to the Threats
The similarities between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror are
further evident in the broadening of executive power and redefinition of
civil liberties in the name of national security. The War on Drugs spawned
narcotics regulations which served as a justification for increasing surveil-
lance on American citizens, particularly members of minority groups.
15 2
Likewise, as a direct reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, United States government and law enforcement officials employed
procedures like racial profiling of Arab and Muslim Americans in the War
on Terror. 53 On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive
Order on Terrorist Financing, naming twenty-seven groups and individu-
als, all Arab or Muslim, as having terrorist links.1 54 Perhaps as an out-
growth of this treatment by United States government forces toward Arab
and Muslim individuals, there is evidence that much of the American pub-
lic also became hostile toward fellow citizens who were Arab or Muslim. 155
151 President Bush Sept. 20, 2001 Address, supra note 141. The President stated: "Our
war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." Id. During that ad-
dress, President Bush announced the creation of a Cabinet-level position in the Office of
Homeland Security, appointing military veteran Tom Ridge as Secretary of Homeland
Security and deeming that office responsible for orchestrating a national strategy for com-
bating terrorism. Id. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the similar appointment of retired
military veterans to positions of czar in the War on Drugs. Whereas all national security
spending totaled $9 billion in 1995, homeland security spending by 2002 reached $29.3
billion, $9.8 billion of which was a result of a supplemental appropriation following Sep-
tember 11. MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: ONE
YEAR ON 137 (2002).
152 Grayson, supra note 34, at 157. This includes more frequent invasions of privacy
through electronic surveillance and police searches. Id.
153 As'AD ABUKHALIL, BIN LADEN, ISLAM, AND AMERICA'S NEW "WAR ON TERRORISM"
85-86 (2002). In the aftermath of the attacks, the arrests of Arabs and Muslims exceeded
1200. Only one of these arrests connected a suspect with the hijackers. Id.
154 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). The Order not only
blocked transactions and property interests of these groups and individuals, but expanded
the class of targeted groups to include all those "associated with" designated terrorist
groups; it also reserved the ability to block assets and deny access to United States markets
to any banks or worldwide organization which does not freeze terrorist assets. Id.
155 AnuKHALIL, supra note 153, at 91. Unrest was evident on commercial airlines fol-
lowing the attacks; there are several reports of pilots and passengers acting in strong opposi-
tion to allowing Arab looking men to board planes. Id. at 82.
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B. Differences Between Legislative Responses to the War on Drugs and
the War on Terror
The power wielded by the United States government in increasing sur-
veillance of citizens following September 11 has been met with consider-
able opposition. Signed into law on October 26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT
Act ("Patriot Act") 56 expanded the authority of United States law en-
forcement in fighting terrorist acts in the United States and abroad, and
increased intelligence authority across telecommunications channels.
57
Aptly named, the Act was drafted with the intention of ensuring the trust of
American citizens in the United States government at a time when the peo-
ple were frightened and needed protection. 158 However, implementation of
the Patriot Act has created a popular backlash against the measures taken
by the Administration. 159 CALEA, which can be viewed as the Patriot
Act's legal counterpart in the War on Drugs, has not met with much oppo-
sition from the American public.
1. Government Responses to Exigencies Created by Terrorism Trigger
Incendiary Reactions
An apparent reason for such incongruity in public response may be that
while the Patriot Act was rather hurriedly enacted as an immediate re-
sponse to the attacks on the World Trade Center, CALEA was a piece of
legislation that had the benefit of deliberative debate and drafting. Accord-
ingly, an extensive legislative history precedes CALEA, exhibiting consid-
erable discussion and a balancing of legislative goals. 160 Yet, CALEA is
156 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
157 O'HANLON ET AL., supra note 149, at 128. Detractors of the Patriot Act have derided
it for infringing upon individual and civil rights in its amendments to the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
which expands federal powers to intercept and share private telecommunications informa-
tion. Id.
158 CLARKE, supra note 150, at 257.
159 Id. at 256-57. For example, the Attorney General's attempted surveillance increases
included authorizing the FBI to monitor library reading records for the possibility of terror-
ist or fundamentalist literature falling into the wrong hands. See id. at 257. Instead of in-
creasing the public's trust in the government, allowing for such actions without judicial
review may have instead served to "fundamentally shake the confidence" of Americans in
the government's capacity to safeguard civil liberties while defeating the terrorists. Id.
'60 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. I. CALEA's drafters sought to "preserve the balance"
reflected in the Oniibus Act and the ECPA. Id. at 14-15. According to CALEA's legisla-
tive history, the bill sought to balance the following core principles: "(1) to preserve a nar-
rowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized
intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally reveal-
ing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications ser-
vices and technologies." Id. at 15. Regarding privacy issues affected by court-ordered wire-
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also a complicated piece of legislation, involving significant technical ter-
minology to the extent that it may not sustain the interest or consideration
of the average American citizen or command significant media attention.
Nevertheless, the complicated language and subject matter is not a pretense
for permitting law enforcement to exploit the ignorance of the American
public by infringing on individual privacy rights. The subject of encroach-
ment on individual rights has become more widely scrutinized and publi-
cized in gauging the effectiveness of the responses to the War on Terror.
2. Objection to Non-Legislative Responses by Government to the War on
Terror
Recently, a program of domestic surveillance on American citizens came
crashing to the foreground in the War on Terror, allowing CALEA and the
surveillance measures used in the War on Drugs to truly shine by contrast.
On December 16, 2005, The New York Times revealed that, shortly after
September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush personally authorized the
National Security Agency ("NSA') to eavesdrop on telephone and e-mail
communications between individuals in the United States and overseas
without first obtaining a warrant. 161 The Office of the Attorney General
justified this practice, stating that intercepting communications of those
who may be linked to terrorists is "clearly reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. 162 Using balancing approach terminology, the Attorney Gen-
eral declared that the interest of the NSA in defending the nation is "the
most compelling interest possible," and outweighs any individual privacy
interests at stake.
163
Despite the fact that law enforcement practices under CALEA and the
Omnibus Act have previously and rather proficiently enlisted major tele-
communications carriers for assistance in conducting electronic surveil-
lance of private lines, news of domestic spying by the NSA has stirred up a
considerable amount of dissension among the American citizenry, as well
as among politicians.' 6' As is the case with CALEA, NSA surveillance
taps under CALEA, legislators noted: "[A]s the potential intrusiveness of technology in-
creases, it is necessary to ensure that government surveillance authority is clearly defined
and appropriately limited." Id. at 18.
161 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. This domestic spying was initiated in response to the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
162 Letter from Asst. Att'y Gen. William E. Moschella to Sen. Pat Roberts, et al., 4 (Dec.
22, 2005).
163 Id.
164 Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Varied Rationales Muddle Issue of NSA Eavesdropping,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at A05. A parallel can be drawn between the public effects of
the current Administration's use of the NSA and the Nixon Administration's use of the
DEA to further political objectives. Following its inception, the DEA faced criticism for
being overzealous in its drug enforcement tactics, specifically with regard to potential
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depends upon cooperation from major telecommunications carriers to as-
sist in intercepting conversations of persons who arouse suspicion because
of their alleged ties to a criminal organization. The most apparent reason
for the discrepancy in public reception of the practices is that CALEA and
the Omnibus Act are codified pieces of legislation that must satisfy high
standards required for obtaining court-ordered intercepts pursuant to stat-
ute, 65 whereas the NSA domestic surveillance was authorized not by en-
acted legislation but by covert order from the President. Moreover, the
NSA's standard for conducting an intercept is merely a "reasonable basis
to believe" a target is linked to Al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organiza-
tion. 1
66
In commencing his program of domestic spying, Bush never sought Con-
gressional approval, relying instead on an asserted "constitutional power
granted to presidents, as well as ...a statutory power. ' 167 Despite such
strong claims of authority, the President did not confidently wield this
power, but rather exerted it by secret order.' 68 The outrage over this clan-
destine operation which appears to jeopardize civil liberties is fueled by the
public's uncertainty regarding the extent to which they were misled into
compromising individual rights. 169 CALEA and the Omnibus Act, on the
other hand, benefit from clearly-defined and publicly available guidelines
and constraints, supported by both the Fourth Amendment and Congres-
sional intent. The notion of reasonableness is considerably more evident
with regard to the practice of electronic surveillance under CALEA and the
Omnibus Act. 170 Finally, the balance inherent in CALEA's goals of pro-
moting fair competition, encouraging innovation, and protecting public
safety and national security, 171 provides for unique cooperation between
law enforcement and business as working pursuant to mutual agreement,
not an order from the President.
172
Fourth Amendment violations occurring during searches and seizures of homes and wire-
taps. Frontline: Drug Wars Television Broadcast Transcript, supra note 8.
165 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
16 Eggen & Pincus, supra note 164.
167 Id. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said the Bush administration did not seek
legislation after determining it would be virtually impossible to obtain. Id.
168 Id. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said that the Administration feared
exposure of the classified program. In truth, the briefings Bush gave about the program
were "limited to the 'Gang of Eight': the speaker and minority leader of the House; the
majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and the chairmen and ranking Democrats on
the two intelligence committees." This group was not permitted to take notes or discuss the
briefing within their offices or with their fellow members of Congress. Id.
169 Id.
170 47 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000). Reasonableness is embodied in CALEA provisions requir-
ing cost-effective methods of capability assistance and compliance. Id. See discussion supra
Part IV.B.2.
171 CALEA NPRM, supra note 118, 49.




While Italian crime syndicates once relied on muscle and lax government
surveillance to subject the United States to their narcotics empire, today's
drug trafficking organizations and modem mobsters were met with a War
on Drugs and legislation aimed at intercepting their communications. In
order to survive, South American and Mexican drug trafficking organiza-
tions invested vast resources in local drug manufacturing and technological
advancements to coordinate smuggling operations through covert tele-
communications. The constraints of Title Ell of the Omnibus Act made it
difficult for law enforcement to monitor the cartels following the breakup
of AT&T and the demise of analog services in favor of digital communica-
tions. Since Congress authorized telecommunications carriers to collabo-
rate with law enforcement on electronic surveillance in CALEA, however,
the drug traffickers have once again become locked in the crosshairs of
effective law enforcement surveillance.
CALEA stands out for being effective without being controversial, de-
spite the fact that it can be used for the interception of virtually any cellular
or Internet communication. CALEA was carefully drafted to allow the
telecommunications industry to innovate and flourish while simultaneously
assisting law enforcement in halting criminal activities occurring over its
communications lines. Moreover, CALEA succeeds in striking a balance
between personal privacy and national security by updating Title In to
adapt to modern telecommunications advancements without doing away
with the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 173 Still,
some minor adjustments will need to be made in order to ensure CALEA
does not fall behind in its electronic surveillance efficacy. The Commis-
sion must establish compliance benchmarks and begin enforcing extension
periods, and must demand the utmost cooperation from carriers to conduct-
ing electronic surveillance on all versions of broadband, VolP, and instant
messaging services.
CALEA stands as a model of how proper electronic surveillance meas-
ures should operate. Thus, it stands in direct opposition to the domestic
surveillance initiative to uncover potential terrorists, which was unilater-
ally authorized by the President with the disputed justification of constitu-
tional war powers. The United States, through Congress and the Commis-
sion, should continue to expand the reach of CALEA to ensure that law
enforcement can effectively fight organized criminal activity, including
terrorism, while protecting civil liberties.
173 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000). In addition, Title III authorizes the interception of wire and
oral communications by electronic surveillance only in very limited circumstances relating
to criminal communications. Id.
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